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The Tokyo Round of trade negotiations was completed in the late 1970s and the final
stages of the agreement were implemented just this past year. Most studies of the
economic effects of the Tokyo Round are in agreement that the major economic players in
the negotiations, the U.S., the EEC, and Japan, will gain, but there is very little
agreement concerning how the smaller countries in the world are going to be affected.
During the course of the negotiations, the developing countries, in particular, were
very concerned with how the multilateral tariff reductions would affect the various trade
preferences that the LDCs had negotiated with the industrialized countries prior to the
Tokyo Round. There are a number of these agreements, such as the Generalized System
of Preferences (GSP) whereby most of the industrialized countries grant duty-free access to
the manufactured exports of the LDCs; the Lom6 agreement, under which the EEC grants
preferential tariffs to many of the developing countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the
Pacific; the Caribbean Basin Initiative, etc. The fear among the LDCs was that a round of
multilateral tariff reductions would erode these tariff preferences, and thus make them
worse off.
In addition to the loss of preferences, many of the products of greatest export interest
to the developing countries, such as textiles and agricultural goods, were not included in
the discussions. These omissions further increased the likelihood that the developing
countries would not gain from the Tokyo Round.
However, the early evidence suggested that the LDCs would, in fact, not be made
worse off by multilateral tariff reductions. Prior to the completion of the Tokyo Round, the
effects of a hypothetical 50% multilateral tariff r ti on the trade effects of the
GSP were examined by Baldwin and Murray (1976) using an ex ante partial equilibrium
model. They found that beneficiary exports attributable to the GSP would decline by $32.2
iThe 50% reduction applies to the tariffs of the U.S., the EEC, and Japan on trade
other than textiles, shoes, and petroleum.
1
2
million based on 1971 trade. However, Baldwin and Murray also found that the
developing countries would increase exports by $401.0 million under a 50% multilateral
tariff cut due to the broader product and country coverage of MFN reductions.
However, most of the studies that followed the Tokyo Round -Baldwin, Mutti, and
Richardson (1980), Brown and Whalley (1980), Deardorff and Stern (1979, 1983), and
Whalley (1982)- found that many of the LDCs would be made worse off after the Tokyo
Round was fully implemented. This result emerged despite the fact that these studies did
not give specific attention to the implications of the Tokyo Round for preferential
agreements, with the exception of the EEC. For example, Whalley, using a general
equilibrium computational model, found that welfare would rise in the EEC, Japan, and
the U.S. by a total of $3.8 billion, based on 1973 trade data, but that the rest of the world
(ROW) would lose almost $2 billion. Whalley attributes this loss to the omission of
agriculture from the Tokyo Round. Deardorff and Stern, also using a computational
model, found that the LDCs gained as a group, but 8 of the 16 LDCs included in the study
were actually made worse off. The losers surprisingly included Singapore, South Korea,
and Hong Kong, three newly industrialized countries (NICs) expected to gain most from a
round of tariff cuts concentrated on manufactured items.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of the Tokyo Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations (MTN) on the major discriminatory trade arrangements. We present
results from the import-disaggregated version of the Michigan Computational Model of
World Production and Trade which has been used to analyze the production, trade,
employment, and price effects of the tariff and some nontariff barrier (NTB) reductions of
the Tokyo Round. The model used in this study, while retaining the same degree of
country and product detail obtained by Deardorff and Stern (1981, 1983) distinguishes
bilateral trade flows. Thus the model can be constrained to reflect preferential trading.
First, the preferential margins afforded by the EEC and the European Free Trade
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Association (EFTA) to their members, tariff preferences under the GSP2, and the tariff-
free trade in transportation equipment between the U.S. and Canada covered by the
Autopact are incorporated. Second, trade in textiles and clothing covered by the Multi-
Fiber Agreement (MFA) is constrained by quota restrictions. Third, tariff changes used in
this study were aggregated to highlight the bilateral nature of the multilateral
negotiations. Negotiated tariff reductions, though applied multilaterally, were partially the
result of bilateral bargaining. Consequently, tariff concessions tended to be larger on
product categories defined to included imports from reciprocating partners, while smaller
on imports from nonreciprocating partners. Finally, the U.S. obtained bilateral
concessions on agricultural from individual partners, which are also included.
The tariff and other concessions are presented and discussed in Section II. Section
III contains a description of the, computational model employed, results are presented in
Section IV, and conclusions in Section V.
II. TARIFF RATE REDUCTIONS IN THE TOKYO ROUND
During the MTN the Swiss tariff cutting formula was accepted as a general guide
but was not applied uniformly by all countries.3 Deviations from this formula occurred
for import sensitive industries or in cases where tariff concessions from significant trade
partners were not obtained.
A summary of the negotiated Tokyo Round tariff concessions is presented in Table 1
for the major countries and regions. These figures were calculated by first aggregating the
base and offer tariff rates for each country from the detailed line-item level to the 4-digit
2The developing countries are beneficiaries of several other preferential schemes
not discussed here. For example, the EEC grants duty-free access to the African,
Caribbean, and Pacific countries for many of their industrial and agricultural exports
under the Lom6 (Togo) Convention (February 28, 1975) and to Algeria, Tunisia, and
Morocco under the Mahgreb Convention (1976). However, the beneficiaries of these
schemes are not included in this study due to the small volume of trade involved.
3The Swiss formula is t1 = 0. 14t0 /(O. 14 + t) where t0 is the base rate and t is
the offer rate. For further discussion of the tariff cutting formulas, see Chan (1985,
pp. 458-459), Chine (1978, pp. 66-83), and Deardorff and Stern (1979, pp. 39-40).
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Brussels Tariff Nomenclature (BTN) level, weighting by each country's total imports.
Tariffs were then aggregated from the BTN to the 22-industry International Standard
Industrial Classification (ISIC) categorization of the model weighting by bilateral imports,
yielding a separate set of tariffs for each pair of trade partners. The difference between
the base and offer rates as a percent of the base rate is reported in Table 1. While 22
tradable product categories are distinguished in the Michigan Model, we have combined
them into four broad categories in this section for ease of exposition. The four categories
are agriculture, wearing apparel (including textiles, furs, and leather), light manufactures,
and heavy manufactures.
The degree of tariff liberalization varies noticeably across countries. The developing
countries agreed to minimal tariff reductions and Australia's tariff concessions are much
smaller than those of the other industrialized countries. Japan's tariff reductions on
manufactured imports from the large trading blocs, the U.S., the EEC, and the EFTA, are
comparable to those offered by these countries. However, Japan's tariff reductions on
imports from the smaller countries - Canada, Australia, and the developing
countries- are much smaller. This may be partially the result of selective concessions.
However, it should be noted that Japan unilaterally reduced tariffs subsequent to the
Kennedy Round. Thus, during the Tokyo Round, Japan accepted the Swiss formula but
was only willing to apply the formula to its tariff rates as they were before the unilateral
liberalization.
Variation in the degree of liberalization across countries has important implications
for the distribution of welfare gains from the Tokyo Round. That is, the countries which
reduce tariffs comparatively deeply will tend to suffer a deterioration in the terms of trade,
which will offset some of the efficiency gains from tariff concessions.
Agricultural products were originally excluded from the negotiations, but in the final
agreement there were some concessions made in this category. However, the reductions
are negligible on important bilateral trade flows. For example, Japan lowered tariffs on
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imports from the EEC but excluded products imported from its major agricultural
suppliers. The average reduction on Japan's imports from the EEC was 8.2%, but there
were virtually no concessions on imports from the U.S., Canada, and Australia. Similarly,
the EEC reduced tariffs on imports from all partners, but the unchanged NTBs on
agriculture and food render these tariff reductions virtually meaningless. In response to
the failure to reach agreement on meaningful liberalization in agriculture on an MFN
basis, the U.S. pursued bilateral discussions with individual countries, and was successful
in obtaining some limited concessions on NTBs in agriculture and food.4
The rates on textiles were lowered substantially as well in some cases, but as with
agriculture, NTBs control trade in these products. The only meaningful concessions were,
therefore, in the manufacturing product categories. The emphasis on manufacturing in the
Tokyo Round benefits Japan, which more than any other industrialized country, is a net
exporter of manufacturing items to all other industrialized countries.
The tariff calculations reflect the preferential arrangements of the EEC, EFTA,
GSP, and Autopact. Both the base and offer rates on trade within the EEC and EFTA are
set at zero. Tariffs on nonagricultural trade between the EEC and EFTA were removed in
1979, so the corresponding tariff changes have been set to zero, as well.
Preferences for the developing countries under the GSP are reflected in the
aggregation of the base and offer rates. For products which receive preferential treatment
the base and offer rates are set equal to a weighted average of the relevant GSP and MFN
rates. The weights are determined by the fraction of imports within a BTN line-item
which actually receive GSP treatment and the fraction subject to the MFN rate. This
adjustment is necessary since a large fraction of LDC exports to the donor countries is
excluded from the GSP for competitive need reasons, or due to quantitative restrictions or
restrictive rules of origin.
4For a details on the concessions, see Deardorff and Stern (1979, pp. 72-79).
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The effect of the Tokyo Round tariff reductions on individual members of the EEC
and EFTA is expected to vary with the size of the country. From the literature on
customs union theory we know that the formation of the union will generally benefit the
smaller members at the expense of the larger members.5
In the standard two good-three country theoretical model the small country will
trade exclusively with its customs union partner. This implies that the small country
receives the world price plus the partner's tariff for its exports to the large partner, but
does not apply a tariff to any of its imports. This arrangement is clearly welfare
improving for the small country, both because it removes the distortion effect of its tariff
on imports and raises the price it receives for its exports over the world price.
In contrast, the large country is generally made worse off by a customs union, for
two reasons. First, the large country loses tariff revenue normally levied on imports from
the partner country. Second, trade continues with the rest of the world and is subject to a
tariff. Thus, at the margin, the trade distorting effect of the tariff remains after the
formation of the customs union.
The tariff reductions in the Tokyo Round then, reduce the distortions attendant to
the tariff in the large country and reduce the transfer from the large country in the union
to the small country. The reduction in the transfer from the large to the small country
effectively improves the large country's terms of trade. Thus, the welfare of the small
country may decline if the deterioration in its terms of trade with the large partner
exceeds the efficiency gain from reducing tariffs on the nonmember trade partners.
A similar argument applies to the developing countries which receive preferential
treatment for their manufactured exports to the industrialized countries. However, there
are factors which offset the erosion of the preferential margin. It is clear from Table 1
that developing country exports still benefit from substantial tariff concessions from the
5For a more complete discussion of the general equilibrium effects of a preferential
tariff, see Chacholiades (1978, pp. 567-75).
7
industrialized countries. Although the preferential margin is eroded, the tariff cuts on
imports from the LDCs are, in many cases, greater than those on exports by EFTA,
Canada, and Australia. Preferences under the GSP are limited by quantitative
restrictions, rules of origin, and product coverage. The Tokyo Round, on the other hand,
covers a much broader range of products which are important LDC exports. Thus it is
possible that the broader product coverage of the Tokyo Round may counter-balance the
loss of preferential treatment.
A second issue concerning the developing countries is the terms-of-trade effect
associated with protectionism in the industrialized countries, a central element of the
North-South debate. The relatively large tariff reductions on LDC exports under the
Tokyo Round, reported in Table 1, indicate a willingness on the part of the industrialized
countries to include products of export interest to the developing countries in the
negotiations. However, it remains to be determined whether tariff concessions by, the
industrialized countries will improve the terms of trade of the developing countries, as the
LDCs contend.
In addition to tariff negotiations, NTB liberalization was discussed extensively
during the Tokyo Round, with modest success. Among the codes concerning NTBs, those
regulating government procurement are the most readily quantifiable, and will be
evaluated in the computational analysis, along with the NTB concessions in agriculture
discussed above. These codes are designed to open bidding on nondefense public
procurement to both domestic and foreign firms. Below we present a computational model
which is used to evaluate these central issues in the Tokyo Round.
IIL THE COMPUTATIONAL MODEL
While the model and its implementation are described in detail in Brown (1984),
some brief comments may be useful here. There are 34 countries included in the model,
with the rest of the world (ROW) constituting an abbreviated 35th country. In addition to
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the 22 tradable goods based on 3-digit ISIC categories, there are seven 1-digit nontradable
industries. Country and industry coverage are shown in Tables 2 and 3.
Any of the 29 goods may be used to satisfy final demand or as intermediate inputs
in the production of other goods. Final and intermediate demand are derived from explicit
utility and production functions assuming utility and profit maximization. Production is
also a function of the primary inputs - capital, which is industry specific, and labor. The
wage paid to labor is fixed and macroeconomic policy is assumed to maintain national
employment at the base level.
Imports are disaggregated by place of production in the manner suggested by
Armington (1969). Each tradable good which enters as an argument in the utility and
production functions is itself an aggregate of the products of each country. A CES function
aggregates the products produced by each of the 34 included countries and the ROW to
form a composite tradable good. The 22 composite goods are then nested in a Cobb-
Douglas utility function and a fixed proportion production function.
Goods markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive and prices are determined in
world markets which equate supply and demand for each of the 22 tradable goods from
each of the 34 countries and the ROW, yielding 770 individual markets. Exchange rates
for most industrialized countries are permitted to fluctuate to maintain the trade balance
at the base level. However, Australia and the EFTA countries (excluding Austria) are
assumed to peg their exchange rates to a basket of currencies. Among the LDCs, Hong
Kong, Israel, Yugoslavia, and Mexico allow their currencies to float, while Singapore is
assumed to peg to a basket of currencies which is dominated by the Japanese yen. The
remaining LDCs, as well as New Zealand, are represented as pegging their currencies, but
subject to the condition that expenditure on imports not exceed the available foreign
exchange earned through exports. This is accomplished with an endogenously determined
tariff equivalent of an import license which constrains the value of import demand to be
equal to the revenue earned through exports.
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Although the underlying market structure is perfectly competitive, the solution of
the model is constrained by the presence of NTBs, which may take the form of a quota or
target price and are represented by their endogenously determined tariff equivalents. The
target price mechanism is included for the purpose of modeling the variable levy on
imports of agricultural products by the EEC. All other NTBs are represented by the quota
facility. 6
The equations of the model are proportionately differentiated, yielding a linear
system that is solved for the percent deviation of each variable from its base level which
occurs as a result of an exogenous change. The tariff reductions discussed in Section II are
exogenously inserted into the model, which is then solved for the percent changes in each
of the variables necessary to restore equilibrium. It is assumed that the tariff reductions
were made all at once rather than being phased in as was actually the case between 1980
and 1987. In addition to the tariff reductions, the agricultural concessions negotiated
between the U.S. and several of its trade partners and the effect of the code regulating
international bidding on nondefense government procurement were included. The
agricultural concessions were modeled as an increase in bilateral quotas in the agriculture
and food product categories. Nondefense government procurement opened for international
bidding was modeled as a switch in demand from the domestic good to imports.
Procurement was allocated between imports and domestically produced goods in proportion
to private consumption patterns.7
The base year for data on production, employment, trade, and tariffs for each of the
34 countries is 1976, which was the reference year for the Tokyo Round negotiations.
Input-output coefficients for the production function are derived from the U.S. input-output
6Th tariff rate which applies to each product category is a weighted average of the
endogenously determined nominal tariff equivalent of each of the applicable NTBs, where
the weight is the fraction of the sector subject to the relevant policy. These weights were
adapted from data in Murray and Walter (1978).
7For more details, see Deardorff and Stern (1979, pp. 68-92).
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table for 1972, and the 1970 tables for each of the members of the EEC, Japan, and
Brazil. The elasticity of substitution in the CES function used to aggregate products from
different sources in the utility and production functions was derived from import demand
elasticities reported in Stern et al. (1976). The elasticity of substitution between capital
and labor in the production function was obtained from Zarembka and Chernicoff (1971).
IV. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS
According to the model calculations, the total volume of world trade is estimated to
increase by $10.9 billion, based on 1976 trade, as a result of the Tokyo Round concessions.
Most of the expansion in trade is accounted for by the industrialized countries, which
increase exports by $10.1 billion. Exports by the LDCs increase _by $821.8 million.
Further details on trade, terms-of-trade, and welfare effects are summarized in Table 2.
The reported changes in the terms of trade are largest for Hong Kong (1.8%), which
is followed closely by Japan (1.4%), Singapore (0.9%), and Israel (0.7%). Thus,
protectionism in the North clearly has negative implications for the terms of trade of some
of the developing countries, with the NICs most adversely affected.
There are several characteristics which lead to a terms-of-trade gain. First, Japan
offered smaller tariff reductions than any other major industrialized country, and the
developing countries agreed only to minimal tariff reductions. Consequently, there is a net
rise in demand for products produced by these countries, requiring an increase in the
relative price. Secondly, the emphasis on manufactures in the Tokyo Round most strongly
affected Japan and those developing countries which are major exporters of manufactured
products, such as Hong Kong and Singapore. Third, close trading ties with a large
industrialized country which is reducing tariffs stimulates exports and improves the terms
of trade. For example, Mexico benefits from tariff cuts by the U.S., and Israel benefits
from tariff cuts by both the U.S. and the EEC.
At the other end of the spectrum are the countries that cut tariffs deeply but did not
obtain similar concessions from their important trading partners. This is most notably the
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case for Canada whose terms of trade deteriorate by 0.8%. The terms of trade also decline
for Chile (- 0.2%). Both of these countries rely heavily on agricultural and materials
exports, products which were not emphasized in the Tokyo Round.
Within the EEC, the terms-of-trade changes depend on the volume of extra-EEC
trade, as discussed in Section II. The Tokyo Round is estimated to improve the terms of
trade of the large members, such as Germany (0.2%), Italy (0.2%), and the U.K. (0.1%) at
the expense of the smaller countries, Belgium-Luxembourg (-0.3%), Denmark (-0.3%),
and the Netherlands (- 0.1%). The EFTA countries are also adversely affected by the
smaller preferential margin received on manufactured products. In particular, the terms
of trade worsen for Finland (- 0.1%), Norway (-0.3%), and Sweden (- 0.3%).
The terms-of-trade changes are reflected in net exports. Most countries included in
the model are constrained to maintain their nominal current account balance at the base
level.8 Hence, a deterioration in the terms of trade requires an increase in exports
relative to imports to finance current imports.9 For example, Canada's exports rise by
$1.1 billion while imports rise by only $815.1 million. A similar pattern emerges for
Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, and France. In contrast, net exports fall if the terms of
trade improve. This is most notably the case for Japan, for which imports rise by $1.4
billion, while exports rise by only $330.4 million. This is also the case for Australia,
Austria, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and the U.K., as well as many of the developing
countries.
8The only exceptions are some of the EFTA countries, the U.S., Australia, and
Singapore. The exchange rates of these countries are pegged, so there is no restriction on
the size of the current account imbalance. In the case of Finland, Norway, Sweden, and
Switzerland the deterioration in the terms of trade lowers the value of exports and raises
the value of imports. However, the exchange rate is pegged so that a current account
deficit results. The opposite holds true for Singapore. The improvement in the terms of
trade raises the value of exports so that a current account surplus emerges.
9The change in the terms of trade reported in Table 2 is the difference between the
percent changes in the cost of the base period export and import bundles. If a country has
a large trade imbalance, this calculation may indicate that the terms of trade and net
exports move in the same direction. This is the case for the Netherlands and several of
the LDCs.
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The welfare effect of the Tokyo Round is measured by the equivalent variation (EV),
the income change at base level prices which yields the same level of utility as the tariff
changes. Among the DCs, Japan appears to gain more than other countries, with an
estimated EV of $1.1 billion which is 0.2% of 1976 GDP. For the small members of the
EEC -Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, and the Netherlands- and some members of
EFTA -Finland, Norway, and Sweden- the deterioration in the terms of trade is
substantial enough to overwhelm the efficiency gains from the tariff cuts, resulting in a
decline in welfare of up to 0.3% of GDP. In addition, the welfare of the U.S. and Canada
decline by $984.7 million and $374.4 million, respectively.
The welfare outcome for the LDCs is variable, as well. EV is positive for most
countries, except Brazil, Colombia, Greece, South Korea, and Spain'0 , and is close to 1%
of GDP for countries such as Hong Kong and Singapore. The tariff concessions in the
Tokyo Round thus appear to have been sufficiently broad to compensate most of the LDCs
for diminished preferential treatment under the GSP.
The effect of the Tokyo Round on the preferential arrangements can be seen more
clearly by examining the bilateral trade flows. The change in bilateral trade among the
three major industrialized country trading blocs are provided in Table 3. The most
surprising result is that trade within the EEC and EFTA actually increases as a result of
the Tokyo Round. The increase in intra-EEC/EFTA trade is most notable in the heavy
manufacturing categories: nonelectric machinery ($512.2 million), electric machinery
($263.4 million), and transportation equipment ($682.1 million). In fact, there are only six
product categories in which intra-EEC/EFTA trade increases less than trade with the U.S.
or Japan. These categories are agriculture, food, chemicals, glass products, iron and steel,
and miscellaneous manufactures.
10There are several cases in which welfare declines for countries which experience a
terms-of-trade gain, such as New Zealand, Brazil, Greece, South Korea, and Spain. This
inconsistency is partially a reflection of the difficulty with calculating the change in the
terms of trade discussed in the previous footnote.
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On a percentage basis the increase in intra-EEC/EFTA trade is much smaller than
the change in trade with the U.S. and Japan. The percent increase in imports (not shown
in the table) from other members ranges from -0.1% to 2.4% over the 22 product
categories. This is much smaller than that for trade with Japan and the U.S., which
range from zero to 17.7%. However, the volume of intra-EEC/EFTA trade is so large that
it increases by $2.6 billion, which is greater than increased imports from the U.S., at $1.6
billion, and several times larger than the change in imports from Japan, which is $214.7
million.
Trade between members rises mainly for two reasons. The improvement in the
terms of trade for some member states increases total imports which are allocated among
various partners according to the pre-existing volume of trade. In particular, Germany,
the U.K., and Italy increase imports from other member partners substantially. The
improvement in the terms of trade of the large members of the EEC and EFTA is balanced
by a deterioration for the smaller countries. Normally we might expect that these two
effects would offset each other, resulting in a zero net change in intra-EEC/EFTA trade.
However, many of the smaller members also peg their exchange rates. The deterioration
in the terms of trade thus is reflected in a current account deficit, rather than in a
reduction in imports. Consequently, total trade within the EEC and EFTA rises.1 1
A second reason for increased trade among EEC members stems from changes in
NTBs. The negotiated increase in government procurement of imports applies to members
as well as nonmembers, further stimulating intra-EEC/EFTA trade.
The terms-of-trade effects also play an important role in determining the pattern of
imports for the U.S. and Japan. The improvement in Japan's terms of trade relative to
1The increase in intra-EEC trade constitutes an important difference between the
results presented here and those obtained by Brown and Whalley (1980), who aggregate
all members of the EEC into a single trading bloc, thus ignoring any changes in trade
within the bloc. Consequently, a 60% tariff reduction in the Brown and Whalley model
would be required to generate world trade increases similar to those obtained in the
current study using tariff reductions which average 25%.
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both the U.S. and the EEC results in increased Japanese imports from both of these
groups. In contrast, U.S. imports increase primarily from the Community. U.S. imports
from Japan actually decline in 9 of the 22 product categories. This is most notably the
case for transportation equipment (-$78.5 million) and iron and steel (-$17.7 million). U.S.
imports from Japan rise by only $154.6 million, which is dramatically smaller than the
$940.1 million increase in imports from the EEC and EFTA.
The bilateral concessions in agriculture and food have a nontrivial effect on the trade
in these products. EEC and EFTA imports of agricultural products from the U.S. increase
by $92.5 million and Japanese imports rise by $163.8 million. U.S. concessions in food
increase U.S. imports from the EEC and EFTA in this product category by $97.5 million
but have no effect on U.S. imports from Japan.
Finally, the increases in LDC exports to the major industrialized countries are
reported in Table 4. As discussed above, the results strongly indicate that the developing
countries would not be adversely affected by the reduction of the preferential margin under
the GSP, due to the Tokyo Round. The LDCs included in the study increase exports to the
industrialized countries by an estimated $523.4 million as a result of the Tokyo Round.
The EEC absorbs most of the new LDC exports, $295.9 million, which is 57% of the total
change. However, on a percentage basis the increase in EEC imports from the developing
countries is similar to that for EFTA and Japan.
Australia and Canada are the only countries which reduce imports (-$2.8 million and
-$6.4 million, respectively) from the developing countries. More significantly, U.S. imports
from the LDCs decline in 5 of the 22 product categories, such as footwear (-$6.9 million),
and petroleum products (-$5.7 million). The total increase in U.S. imports from the
developing countries is $115.9 million, which is less than half of the increase in EEC
imports from the LDCs.
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V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented the results of a general equilibrium computational
evaluation of the tariff and some NTB concessions in the Tokyo Round, with an emphasis
on the bilateral or otherwise preferential trade characteristics. The tariff rate changes
were aggregated using bilateral trade weights in order to reflect the bilateral nature of the
negotiations, and the solution was constrained by the presence of five preferential trading
arrangements, the EEC, EFTA, GSP, MFA, and Autopact. The main conclusions are as
follows:
1. Tariff rate concessions were consistently largest for the exports of Japan, the
EEC, and the U.S. and smallest for the less dominant of the industrialized countries,
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. In spite of the reduction of the preferential margin
provided for by the GSP, tariff cuts were larger for the LDCs than for some of the smaller
industrialized countries.
2. Changes in the terms of trade are an important determinant of the distribution of
the welfare gains due to the Tokyo Round. The terms of trade are shown to improve for
countries with smaller than average tariff concessions, Japan, Australia, New Zealand,
and the LDCs, and to deteriorate for the countries which cut tariffs deeply, like Canada.
3. Japan and such developing countries as Hong Kong and Singapore appear to be
the major beneficiaries of the Tokyo Round. Japan gains because its tariff concessions
were smaller than average, and it is a major exporter of the manufactured products
heavily emphasized in the final negotiated agreement. The Tokyo Round appears less
beneficial to exporters of agricultural products, such as Brazil and Colombia.
4. Despite the erosion of the preferential margin provided for under the GSP, most
of the LDCs appear to be better off with the tariff reductions in the Tokyo Round. In
addition, the Tokyo Round generally improved the terms of trade in the developing
countries. This result lends support to the claim by the developing countries that
protectionism in the North worsens the terms of trade for the South.
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5. Two of the larger members of the EEC, Germany and Italy, are shown to benefit
by the reduction of the tariff wall around the EEC. The smaller members of the EEC and
EFTA, which trade primarily with the larger members, are made worse off.
6. Trade within the EEC and EFTA is seen to increase with the Tokyo Round. This
surprising result emerges because larger members enjoy a terms-of-trade gain, which
increases imports from all partners, including members of the EEC and EFTA.
Deterioration in the terms of trade partially reduces imports by the smaller members but
also increases the current account deficit for those countries which peg their exchange
rates. Further, the relaxation of restrictions on government procurement was applied to
imports from members as well as nonmembers, thus further increasing intra-EEC trade.
7. While the results presented here are broadly similar to those obtained in previous
studies of the Tokyo Round, such as Brown and Whalley (1980), Deardorff and Stern
(1979, 1983), and Whalley (1982), there are some important differences as well, because
of the aggregation of the EEC which precludes the inclusion of the increase in intra-EEC/
EFTA trade as a result of the Tokyo Round or because EEC and EFTA tariff concessions
are applied to all countries of the model, including other members.
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TABLE I
PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN TARIFFS RATES NEGOTIATED IN THE TOKYO ROUND
IMPORTING REGION
EXPORTING REGION

























































































































































































Source: based on data
Representative
supplied by the Office of the U.S. Trade
*Agriculture - Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing; food, beverages
and tobacco
Nondurable Manufactures - Textiles; wearing apparel; leather and leather
and fur products; footwear
Semi-manufactures - wood and wood products; furniture and fixtures; paper
and paper products; printing and publishing; chemicals; petroleum and
related products; rubber products; nonmetal mineral products; glass and
glass products
Durable manufactures - Iron and steel basic industries; non-ferrous metal
basic industries; metal products; electrical and non-electrical machinery;
transport equipment; miscellaneous manufactures
+Excluding Portugal
TABLE 2
ESTIMATED CHANGES IN COUNTRY IMPORTS, EXPORTS, US
BILATERAL TRADE, TERMS OF TRADE AND WELFARE
DUE TO THE TOKYO ROUND
(Trade in Millions of U.S. Dollars)
TOTAL TRADE TRADE WITH U.S. TERMS OF WELFARE
COUNTRY TRADE
IMPORTS* EXPORTS* IMPORTS* EXPORTS* % CHANGE $ Mill. % GDP
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES:
Australia 133.6 36.5 77.2 4.5 0.2 43.3 0.04
Austria 83.0 67.7 20.1 20.0 0.3 24.3 0.06
Canada 815.1 1146.2 630.6 828.2 -0.8 -374.4 -0.19
Finland 228.2 117.8 25.3 17.4 -0.1 -4.6 -0.02
Japan 1359.4 330.4 716.5 154.6 1.4 1050.7 0.19
New Zealand 28.6 28.9 10.3 13.7 0.1 -16.0 -0.12
Norway 338.8 151.2 48.5 20.5 -0.3 -33.7 -0.11
Sweden 757.6 383.1 103.0 44.0 -0.3 -91.3 -0.12
Switzerland 441.4 213.7 61.5 79.3 -0.0 24.7 0.04
United States 2023.0 3556.1 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -984.7 -0.06
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY:
Belgium-Luxembourg 315.1 406.1 111.2 34.8 -0.3 -220.5 -0.31
Denmark 129.3 177.1 36.4 35.7 -0.3 -49.1 -0.12
France 628.9 713.9 274.7 132.0 -0.1 -66.0 -0.02
Germany 1342.3 1053.0 379.6 210.5 0.2 165.5 0.04
Ireland 22.8 10.4 13.7 6.8 0.4 14.8 0.18
Italy 425.7 363.9 122.4 109.5 0.2 72.0 0.04
Netherlands 338.9 357.8 136.3 33.9 -0.1 -32.4 -0.04
United Kingdom 653.7 630.8 317.0 195.8 0.1 -8.8 -0.00
TOTAL EC 3856.7 3713.0 1391.4 759.0
TOTAL INDUSTRIALIZED 10065.5 9744.6 3084.5 1941.1
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
Argentina 30.8 20.1 10.4 1.8 0.1 3.6 0.01
Brazil 61.9 58.1 39.0 4.2 0.1 -8.4 -0.01
Chile 17.3 18.1 10.3 1.2 -0.2 2.8 0.03
Colombia 13.4 12.7 10.3 1.4 -0.0 -3.5 -0.02
Greece 17.8 28.7 5.0 0.2 0.3 -0.7 -0.00
Hong Kong 119.4 2.5 31.6 3.4 1.8 138.3 1.49
India 49.3 33.9 16.3 4.0 0.2 15.5 0.02
Israel 26.2 13.4 11.1 4.0 0.7 19.5 0.14
South Korea 103.7 75.6 48.1 26.3 0.4 -7.2 -0.03
Mexico 85.2 53.2 92.1 42.1 0.6 12.9 0.02
Portugal 1.2 11.1 1.9 1.4 0.1 1.5 0.01
Singapore -7.9 8.2 16.7 1.6 0.9 53.5 0.91
Spain 152.3 173.0 38.2 14.7 0.2 -18.9 -0.02
Taiwan 93.7 56.2 49.5 10.9 0.3 20.6 0.12
Turkey -2.6 8.5 4.2 -0.4 0.2 2.4 0.01
Yugoslavia 60.0 38.0 6.4 -0.9 0.6 32.5 0.10
TOTAL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 821.8 611.3 391.2 115.9
ALL COUNTRIES** 10887.2 10355.9 3475.6 2057.0
*Dollar value of change in trade volume
**Excluding the rest of the world
4
TABLE 3
ESTIMATED CHANGES IN BILATERAL IMPORTS
DUE TO THE
FOR THE EEC, EFTA,
(Millions of
TOKYO ROUND
JAPAN, AND THE U.S.
U.S. Dollars)
EEC/EFTA+ IMPORTS FROM JAPANESE IMPORTS FROM US IMPORTS FROM
PRODUCT EEC EEC EEC

























































































































































































ESTIMATED CHANGES IN LDC EXPORTS DUE TO
THE TOKYO ROUND
(Millions of US Dollars)
IMPORTING COUNTRY
PRODUCT TOTAL
EEC EFTA4 AUSTRAL. CANADA JAPAN U.S.
Agriculture
Food
Textiles
Clothing
Leather Prod.
Footwear
Wood Prod.
Furniture,
Fixtures
Paper Prod.
Printing,
Publishing
Chemicals
Petrol. Prod.
Rubber Prod.
Non-metal
Mineral Prod.
Glass Prod.
Iron, Steel
Non-ferrous
Metals
Metal Prod.
Non-electric
Machinery
Electric
Machinery
Transport
Equipment
Misc. Mfr's
TOTAL
-2.5
-2.0
4.7
17.9
34.7
0.5
8.6
8.9
7.6
1 .4
29.9
0.8
17.3
11.6
1.3
11.0
15.3
23.9
16.8
1.3
0.4
-0.7
4.8
0. 7
0. 3
1.0
0.7
0.3
1.6
1.2
0.1
0.9
0.1
-0.0
0.7
0.7
-0.1
-0.8
0.2
0.4
0.0
2.3
0.0
-0.6
-0.0
-1 .7'
0.9
0.0
-0.0
0.1
1.0
-1.1
-0.0
-3.3
-0.3
0.5
0.8
0.2
0.1
0.3
-0.2
A.O0
-1.3
-0.1
0.1
-0.3
0.6
1.2
-0.1
-3.3
0.2
-1.4
-6.4
6.6
5.3
1.0
0.6
0.4
2.9
0.6
4.5
0.2
0.2
3.1
-5.2
1.5
2.7
0.2
2.1
4.2
1.3
1.9
17.4
-0.2
-6.9
14.8
26.7
5.5
7.9
31.1
39.5
-1.9
25.0
1.3 18.1
0.6 9.1
-0.7
5.0
-5.7
-4.4
8.0
0.5
3.9
1.0
39.5
-10.7
14. 1
23.2
2.2
16.8
1.5 -0.0
2.2 -0.2
4.2 0.1 21.7
2.9 4.5 34.5
3.8 14.2 39.8
6.9 31.3 55.2
19.8 2.3 -0.2
18.2 3.5 -1.4
36. 1
31.1
295.9
8.5
5.4
52.8
0.3
-3.4
-2.8
4.4
19.1
67.9
12.9
11.9
115.9
62.3
62.8
523.4
+Excluding Portugal
